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I. Introduction
This article is intended to aid companies that collect, process, or
use personal data in Germany (e.g., U.S. companies with German
entities or that are themselves entities of a German company) in
regards to U.S. federal Electronic Discovery (e-discovery) under the
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).1 Part II will discuss the
broad scope of that discovery, its conflict with the
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (German Data Protection Act, BDSG), and
potential sanctions for failing to comply. In Parts III and IV, this
article will address ways to prevent discovery of information
covered by the BDSG. The Hague Evidence Convention will be
discussed in Part V as an alternative to discovery under the FRCP.
Finally, Part VI will offer advice on how German parties can best
avoid problems with U.S. e-discovery.
II. U.S. E-Discovery Conflicts With the
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG)
German-based companies, as well as non-EU companies that
collect, process or use personal information in Germany, are subject
to the BDSG's prohibition on the disclosure of personal information
of individuals. 2 However, if that company is sued in a U.S. court, it
is likely to be subject to e-discovery, the extensive discovery of its
electronically-stored information (ESI). As this Part explains, this
leads to the real possibility of the company being forced to choose
either to violate German law or face crippling sanctions in the
United States.
A. U.S. E-Discovery
Discovery in the United States is a broad tool for gathering
information from the opposing party in a lawsuit. In the U.S.
federal courts, discovery is governed by the FRCP, primarily Rule
26.3 The FRCP specifically includes discovery of electronically
stored data (e-discovery), though there are some limits where
gathering and disclosing the data would be too difficult or too
1. For simplicity, this article will refer to the party requesting discovery as the
"U.S. party" and the party covered by the BDSG as the "German party." However,
any non-EU party that collects, processes or uses personal data in Germany is also
subject to the BDSG (see Part lI.C).
2. Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act], Jan. 14,
2003, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, [BGBL.] I at 66, § 1, no. 2, 5, as amended, Gesetz [G],
Aug. 14, 2009 [BGBL. 1] at 2814, art. 1 (Ger.).
3. U.S. state court systems follow their own discovery rules (e.g., California
discovery, CAL. CODF Cly. PROC. § 2016.010 et seq.). However, this memo will focus
on the federal discovery rules because state rules are often similar to the federal
rules, and many of the cases that involve foreign discovery proceed in federal court.
Furthermore, a summary of all U.S. state laws is beyond the scope of this article.
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costly.4  In general, a party can discover any non-privileged,
relevant information.5 With the rise of e-discovery, the result is that
parties in many cases request discovery of vast amounts of ESI.
One influential case presents an overview of modern federal
e-discovery. In Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, the plaintiff alleged
gender discrimination by her former employer, UBS, and sought
discovery of all emails the company had related to her. 6 UBS kept
emails in three electronic formats: an active email system, optical
discs, and magnetic backup tapes.7 However, UBS objected to
discovery of information on the backup tapes because restoring
them to an accessible format would cost approximately $175,000,
plus the costs for an attorney to review the results.8 Each tape
would take five days to restore, and there were 94 relevant tapes.9
Ultimately, the court ordered UBS to restore five tapes of the
plaintiff's choosing, and then the court would review the results to
determine whether more e-discovery should proceed. 10 The court
also discussed the possibility of "cost-shifting," though the court did
not apply this to this decision." Cost-shifting would indicate that
the plaintiff could discover the data, but she would have to pay
some or all of the costs of discovering it.
Another recent workplace discrimination case illustrates the
immense number of documents that could be requested through
e-discovery. In Moore v. Publicis Groupe, e-discovery could have
encompassed up to three million documents. 12 The defendants tried
to limit their production to the first 40,000 documents that were
identified by a search, which would already cost an estimated
4. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(2)(B); FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1)(A).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
6. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake 1), 217 F.R.D. 309, 312-13 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
7. Id. at 313-18.
8. Id. at 312.
9. Id. at 314.
10. Id. at 324.
11. Id. There were a total of five Zubulake decisions discussing issues of cost
shifting, data sampling, sanctions for spoliation, and more. See Zubulake 1, 217
F.R.D. at 309, Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake II), 230 F.R.D. 290 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
12. Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 2012 WL 607412, at *1 -3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012).
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$200,000.13 However, the court rejected this limit because it did not
factor in a consideration of the results of that search.14
One way the parties in Moore could have sorted through the
documents is to run a simple keyword search (i.e., Google), but the
court criticized that method as over-inclusive and ineffective. 5 In
other words, a keyword search would produce irrelevant results,
and would still require manual review of many thousands of
documents. Thus, the court ruled in favor of "computer-assisted
review" whereby a sophisticated computer program would be
taught to identify relevant electronic documents.16
When parties are required to run keyword searches like those
discussed (and rejected) in Moore, the process of choosing those
terms can be contentious. In Capitol Records v. MP3tunes, both
parties to a Digital Millennium Copyright Act infringement case
sought discovery of the other party's emails using keyword
searches.17 The defendants agreed to use nine search terms on its
email, but disputed 30 other search terms.'8 Meanwhile, the
plaintiffs objected to several of the keyword searches of its emails,
trying to limit the search results to ten rather than the requested
twenty.19 Ultimately, the court ordered both parties to run searches
using the requested keywords, though it limited the scope of the
search of the plaintiff's emails by adding another term connected by
the word "and,"thus narrowing the search results. 20 The court also
specified that the plaintiff's top fifteen employees' emails would be
subject to the searches.2'
As Zubulake, Moore, and Capital Records illustrate, parties can
use e-discovery to force the opposing side to disclose vast amounts
of ESI. When this information is inaccessible, preparing it can be
very time-consuming, contentious, and costly.
13. Moore, 2012 WL 607412, at *3.
14. Id.
15. Id. at *10.
16. Id. at *2.
17. Capitol Records v. MP3tunes, 261 F.R.D. 44, 47, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
18. Id. at 48.
19. Id. at 51, 53-54.
20. Id. at 53, 54.
21. Id. at 54.
2012] 115
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B. Principles of Taking Evidence in Germany
The basic principle of taking evidence under the German Rules
of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozeflordnung, ZPO) are expressed in §
355.22 According to this provision, evidence shall be taken in front
of the court, only. This principle is based on the assumption that the
court must get a personal impression of the evidence to give it a just
and fair consideration. 23 Once the court is of the opinion that taking
evidence is necessary, the procedure enters into a specific phase.
Whereas prior to the taking of evidence the procedure was subject to
the dominion of the parties (Parteiherrschaft), it is now in the hands
of the court (Amtsbetrieb); the parties may cooperate and attend (§
357 ZPO) but are not allowed to intervene with the court handled
proceeding. 24
The court is not, however, free to decide whether to take
evidence, and if so, what piece of evidence shall be taken. Evidence
is only to be taken, if (i) a certain fact is disputed among the parties,
(ii) such fact is of importance for the legal situation regarding the
matter at dispute, and (iii) the party bearing the burden of proof
requests the taking of the evidence. 25
By requesting the court to take evidence in the form of
electronic data, the party requesting the evidence has to identify the
fact that shall be proven by the evidence and has to provide the
electronic data to the court. 26 If the electronic data is not at the
disposal of the requesting party, the party may petition for a court
order. The court may then compel the person in control of the
electronic data to produce such data, irrespective of whether the
person in control of the data is the opposing party or a third
person.27 However, the latter requires that the requesting party is
otherwise entitled under the substantive law to the production of the
22. Bundesgesetzblatt, [BGBL.] I at 3202, § 355 (Ger.).
23. Zivilprozefgordnung [ZPO] [German Rules of Civil Procedure], 1877,
Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBL.], at 97, as amended, § 355 (Ger.); for exceptions, see §§ 361,
363, 372(2), 375, 402, 434, 451.
24. ADOLF BAUMBACH, WOLFGANG LAUTERBACH, JAN ALBERS & PETER HARTMANN,
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG (ZPO): BECKSCHE KURz-KOMMENTARE, Obers § 355 Rn.5 (69th
ed. 2011).
25. Id. § 284 Rn.4, 23; for ex officio-exceptions, see ZPO, supra note 23, § 144.
26. ZPO, supra note 23, § 371(1).
27. Id. § 371(2).
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electronic data.28
Hence, the principle rules on taking evidence in Germany
require that the party requesting the taking of evidence can identify
not only the fact that it wants to prove, but also the specific piece of
evidence that it wants to use.29 Furthermore, such party needs to
produce the piece of evidence either by itself or through the person
that has the piece of evidence at its disposal and is obliged under
substantive law to produce it. If, however, the requesting party is
not entitled by the substantive law to let the piece of evidence be
produced, the person in control of the piece of evidence cannot be
forced to produce it under the German Rules of Civil Procedure. In
short, there is no procedural institute in Germany comparable to the
U.S. e-discovery.
C. Exceptions for U.S. E-Discovery Under the BDSG?
1. Basic Principles of the BDSG
In 1995, The European Council and Parliament passed Directive
95/46/EC which protects the privacy of personal data within the
European Union.30 As a directive, EU member states were then
required to draft their own privacy protection laws that would put
the directive's principles into effect. 31 In Germany, this legislation
was the Federal Data Protection Act, the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz
(BDSG). 32 The latest version came into force on September 1, 2009.33
Although this article specifically addresses the BDSG, other EU
28. Id. at § 371(2)2, §§ 422 et seq.
29. BAUMBACH, LEUTERBACH, ALBERS & HARTMANN, supra note 24, § 284 Rn.23.
30. See generally Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data 23/11/1995, 1995 O.J. (L
281) 31 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CELEX:31995LOO46:en:HTML.
31. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 288, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) (2010/C83/01) 53; see also The
European Commission, What Are EU Directives?, (9/23/12) available at http://ec.
europa.eu/ eu law/ introduction/what directive en.htm.
32. Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act], Jan. 14,
2003, at 66.
33. See generally id., available at http://www.bfdi.bund.de/SharedDocs/
Publikationen/GesetzeVerordnungen/BDSG.pdf?_blob=publicationFile (official
German text), http://www.bfdi.bund.de/EN/DataProtectionActs/Artikel/BDSG
idFvOlO92009.pdf?_blob=publicationFile (English translation).
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nations' data protection laws are similar because they are based on
the same underlying directive.34
The BDSG prohibits the disclosure of personal data to a party
outside the European Union without the subject's consent (transfer
restriction).35 The law applies to German public bodies, German
companies, and non-EU companies that collect, process, or use
(collectively "handle") data within Germany (collectively and
individually "German party"). 36 This is important because the
BDSG applies to U.S.-based companies with an office or a subsidiary
in Germany. Therefore, when a party in a U.S. lawsuit requests
personal data from a German party, the German party would
violate German law by disclosing such data. In the event of a
violation, the BDSG authorizes administrative fines of up to
E300,000, or any amount necessary to negate the economic
advantage gained through the violation. 37 In addition, a violation
can constitute a possible criminal offense, punishable by further
fines and/or imprisonment of up to two years.38
The BDSG broadly defines "personal data" as any "information
concerning the personal or material circumstances" of a natural
34. The European Commission collects information on member state
implementation of the directive. Examples of such national laws include Data
Protection Act, 1998, C. 29 (U.K.); Protecci6n de Datos de Caricter Personal, (1999,
15/1999) (Spain); Stb. 2000, p. 302 (Neth.); Status of Implementation of Directive
95/46, European Commission Justice available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/
policies/privacy/law /implementation en.htm (last visited June 22, 2012); see also
International Principles on Discovery, Disclosure, & Data Protection (2011), The
Sedona Conference Publications International available at https://
thesedonaconference.org/publications.
However, it bears noting that the state of European data protection laws is
not likely to remain static. On January 25, 2012, the European Commission
published a draft proposal entitled Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing
of personal date and on the free movement of such data [General Data Protection
Regulation] COM (2012) 0011. One of the goals of that proposal is to eventually
impose uniform data protection laws throughout the EU. According to Art. 88 of
the draft proposal, the General Data Protection Regulation will repeal Directive
95/46/EC. In Art. 91, the proposal provides for a two year transition period before
it will enter into force.
35. BDSG, § 4(c)(1)(1) (consent exception), §§ 15, 16 (prohibitions of data
transfer).
36. Id. §§ 1(2) (application to public and private bodies), 1(5) (EU member
exception and application to foreign companies operating in Germany).
37. Id. §§ 43(3), 44(1).
38. Id.
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person. 39 Although the BDSG does not list specific types of data
that would fall into this definition, this definition appears to include
a person's telephone number,40 address, job, familial status, credit
information, medical history, as well as biometrical data, such as
fingerprintS41 or X-ray photographS42, and genetic data, such as
DNA. 43 Such data cannot be transferred to parties outside of the
European Union (such as the opposing party in a U.S. lawsuit)
unless it fits within one of several narrow exceptions contained in
the BDSG.
2. Exceptions to the Restriction of Transferring Personal Data
In addition to the BDSG's transfer restriction, there is a general
requirement that the data are used only for the purpose for which
they were collected (purpose restriction).44 Because these two
restrictions are independent, in order to transfer data to the United
States, a company subject to the BDSG must have both a transfer
exception and a purpose exception to the BDSG. While the transfer
exceptions are contained in 4c of the BDSG, the purpose exceptions
are in BDSG §§ 14 and 28.
a. Consent, BDSG § 4(c)(1)(1)
The first exception in BDSG § 4(c)(1) is derived from § 2 article
7(a) of Directive 95/46/EC and allows a transfer outside of the EU if
the data subject (i.e., the person the data is related to) consents.4 5
There is a corresponding consent exception to the purpose
restriction in BDSG § 14(2)(2). Thus, if such consent is valid, it
would satisfy both the transfer and purpose restrictions of the
BDSG. Such consent must meet certain strict requirements, such as
39. Id. § 3(1) ("Personenbezogene Daten sind Einzelangaben tiber persinliche
oder sachliche Verhaltnisse einer bestimmten oder bestimmbaren nattirlichen
Person (Betroffener).").
40. Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] [New Weekly Legal Reporter] 1987, 674,
Bundesarbeitsgericht (1. Senat), Beschluss vom 27.05.1986 - 1 ABR 48/84 (Ger.).
41. Elektronische Datenverarbeitung-Recht [EDV-Recht] [Electronic Data
Processing Law], 345/51, VG Wiesbaden (Ger.).
42. Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] [New Weekly Legal Reporter] 1979, 601,
LG Gottingen, Urteil vom 16.11.1978 - 2 0 152/78 (Ger.).
43. Schild, in: Beck'scher Online-Kommentar zum Datenschutzrecht, § 3 BDSG
Rn.1, 8-10 (Ger.).
44. BDSG, § 14(1).
45. Id. § 4c(1)1.
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being in writing.46
Nonetheless, this possibility is not fully under the control of the
German party because the subject of the information could refuse to
consent to its disclosure. Furthermore, as discussed above, the
major scope of modern e-discovery means that there could be
hundreds or thousands of subjects covered by the discovery request,
making it impractical or even impossible to gather the consent of all
of those subjects in time to comply with a discovery request.
b. Legally Required, BDSG § 4(c)(1)(4)
The most obvious exception in the BDSG is in § 4(c)(1)(4) and
respectively in § 2 article 7(c) of Directive 95/46/EC. It applies to
transfers that are "legally required ... for the establishment, exercise
or defense of legal claims before a court."47 There is a corresponding
exception to the purpose restriction where the use is "allowed or
required by law," BDSG § 14(2)(1).
At first glance, this would seem to permit the disclosure of the
information during U.S. discovery because the German party would
be defending a legal claim. However, it is unlikely that U.S. pretrial
discovery qualifies as a proceeding "before a court" by German
standards.48 This is because of the differences between U.S. pretrial
proceedings and the German rules on taking evidence. The U.S.
pretrial discovery process described above in Part II.A occurs after
the filing of a lawsuit, but prior to the actual litigation in a
courthouse. This is very different from the judge-guided process for
taking evidence in Germany, described in Part II.B. In fact, there is
no requirement in Germany that obligates parties to reveal
information, which helps the opponent's case.49 Thus, it is unlikely
that the BDSG exception for required disclosures before a court
applies to a proceeding that is unknown in Germany and takes place
46. Id. § 4a.
47. Id. § 4(c)(1)(4) (emphasis added).
48. Andrea Patzak et al., Cross Border Data Transfer in E-Discoveries in the U.S.
and the European and German Privacy Laws, 1 COMPUTER L. REV. INT'L 13, 14 (2011)
(Ger.). Although the phrase "before a court" is omitted from the English translation
of the BDSG on the BfDI website, it is present in the official German language
version ("die Ubermittlung for die Wahrung eines wichtigen bffentlichen Interesses
oder zur Geltendmachung, Ausibung oder Verteidigung von Rechtsanspruchen
vor Gericht erforderlich ist" (italics added)). BDSG, § 4(c)(1)(4).
49. MATHIAS REIMANN & JOACHIM ZEKOLL, INTRODUCTION To GERMAN LAW, 317
(2005).
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outside the walls of the court. 50
Furthermore, responding to a discovery request does not
qualify as a "legally required" transfer under the BDSG.51 Article 29
of EU Directive 95/46/EC established the Data Protection Working
Party, which examined the issue of conflict between pretrial
discovery and data protection in Europe under the directive. 52 In
respect to a "legally required" transfer, the Data Protection Working
Party believes that the exception applies to legal requirements of that
state, not of a foreign state.53 Thus, a "legally required" transfer
under the BDSG is one that is required by German law, not U.S. law.
However, the U.S. legal obligation would qualify as "legally
required" if it also created a legal obligation in Germany.M This
would be possible, for instance, if the request were made through
the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters (Hague Evidence Convention), discussed
below.55 Nonetheless, Germany made an Article 23 reservation to
the Hague Evidence Convention, which relieves it from the
responsibility of complying with requests for common law pretrial
discovery of documents (see Part V.A).56 Thus, there is no
obligation under German law to comply with a U.S. documentary
discovery request. Therefore, such a request would not be "legally
required" for purposes of the exception to the transfer restriction.
c. Adequate Level of Protection, BDSG § 4(c)(2)
A German party may transfer data outside of the European
Union if the receiving entity offers an "adequate level of protection"
50. Patzak, supra note 48, at 13.
51. Id. at 15.
52. Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and of the Council, supra note
30, art. 29; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document 1/2009 on
Pretrial Discovery for Cross Border Civil Litigation 9 (No. 00339/09/EN, WP 158, 2009)
[hereinafter Working Document on Pretrial Discovery], available at http://ec.
europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/ docs/ wpdocs/ 2009/wpl58_en.pdf.
53. Working Document on Pretrial Discovery, supra note 52, at 9.
54. Id.
55. Id.; The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters, art. 23, 18 March 1970, 23 U.S.T. 255, 847 U.N.T.S. 231
[hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention].
56. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 55; The Hague Conference of
International Private Law, Members, www.hcch.net (includes reservations of each
signatory).
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of that data as determined by the German data protection authority,
the Bundesbeauftragte fur den Datenschutz und die
Informationsfreiheit (BfDI).57 The European Commission has
certified some non-EU countries as providing an adequate level of
protection.58  The United States has not been certified by the
European Commission, and thus a data transfer to the United States
does not fall within the scope of the exemption granted by the
BDSG. However, companies that self-certify with the U.S.-EU Safe
Harbor Framework do receive a finding of adequacy. 59 This
program is discussed further below in the recommendations in Part
VI.
Even if the receiving party provides an adequate level of
protection, the use of personal data by a German party for litigation
must also comply with the purpose restriction. As discussed above,
the consent and legally required transfer exceptions each exist as an
exception to both the purpose and the transfer restriction. However,
there is no purpose exception that specifically corresponds to the
adequate-level-of-protection transfer exception. Nonetheless, it
would be possible to allow discovery by combining the adequate-
level-of-protection transfer exception with the legitimate-interest-of-
the-data-controller purpose exception, discussed next.
d. Legitimate Interest of Data Controller, BDSG § 28(1)(2)
A highly relevant exception to the purpose restriction is
contained in § 28(1)(2) of the BDSG, and respectively in § 2 article
57. BDSG, § 4(c)(2).
58. Those countries are Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Canada, Switzerland,
Faeroe Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, and Jersey. See European Commission,
Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data in Third
Countries, (11/06/2012), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/
international-transfers/ adequacy/ indexen.htm.
59. The U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework is a program run by the U.S.
Department of Commerce. It allows U.S. companies to certify that they meet certain
privacy standards. Once they are certified, those companies are able to transfer data
from the EU to the United States because the European Commission considers
certified companies to provide and adequate level of data protection. Commission
Decision 2000/520, Pursuant to Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and of
the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by the Safe Harbour
Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the U.S.
Department of Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7, 15 (EC); EXPORT.GOV, Welcome to the
U.S.-EU Safe Harbor, (last visited Sept. 23, 2012),
http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/index.asp.
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7(f) of Directive 95/46/EC. It allows disclosure of protected data for
commercial purposes "to safeguard legitimate interests of the
controller" so long as the data subject does not have "an overriding
legitimate interest" in not disclosing it.60
Consequently, in regards to the directive, the Data Protection
Working Party believes that using the legitimate-interest purpose
exception requires balancing the interests of the data controller
against those of the data subject. 61 Thus whether or not this
exception would apply depends on the specific litigation and the
information being sought. Therefore, the data controller could
decrease the impact on the data subject by culling out nonrelevant
information and, to the extent possible, anonymizing the
information (i.e., removing information that identifies a particular
individual).62 With a minimal impact on the data subject, the
balance would then tip in favor of allowing disclosure to protect a
legitimate interest of the data controller. Nonetheless, because the
Data Protection Working Party offered this advice in reference to the
underlying directive, it is not clear whether German authorities
would interpret the exception embodied in the BDSG in the same
way.
e. Other Exceptions
Another exception to the transfer restriction in BDSG §
4(c)(1)(5) is if "the transfer is necessary to protect the vital interests
of the data subject." 63 It is at least theoretically possible that a
German company would be protecting some vital interest of the
subject of the data by giving the data to an opposing party in a U.S.
lawsuit, but such circumstances are difficult to imagine. In any
event, this exception will not always, if ever, apply to U.S. e-
discovery.
Similarly, the remaining three exceptions in § 4(c) of the BDSG
deal with situations where the German company gathered the data
specifically to utilize it to fulfill a contract or create a public record.64
Thus none of these transfer exceptions are relevant to e-discovery
60. BDSG, § 28(1)(2).
61. Working Document on Pretrial Discovery, supra note 52, at 2.
62. Id. at 10.
63. BDSG, § 4(c)(1)(5).
64. Id. §§ 4(c)(1- 3), (6).
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context.
f. Conclusion
Depending on the number of subjects involved and the lack of
control by the German party with regard to the consent of those
individual subjects, the consent exception is generally impractical to
achieve. The legally required exception of the BDSG does not apply
to U.S. e-discovery. Certification with the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor
Framework requires compliance with certain data protection
measures that would need to be in place before the time of the
e-discovery; and additionally requires that the interests of the data
subject do not outweigh the legitimate interest of the data controller.
Hence, the disclosure of personal data that were collected, processed
or used in Germany (or in any other EU state) in the course of a U.S.
e-discovery procedure is very often in conflict with the BDSG. The
German party is then in the conflicted position of either complying
with e-discovery disclosure obligations (and violate the BDSG) or
denying disclosure of personal data in the U.S. e-discovery because
of the restrictions in the BDSG (and violate its U.S. procedural
obligations).
D. Potential Sanctions for Noncompliance in the United States
and Germany
If a German party does not disclose the data, the requesting
party can ask the U.S. court for a "motion to compel discovery." 65 A
motion to compel discovery is a formal request that the court forces
the other party to respond to the discovery. 66 If a court order
compels discovery, but the company still refuses to disclose the
information, it could be subject to sanctions. 67 These sanctions may
include holding the German party in civil contempt of court, or
finding inferences against the company, but it generally will not
include default judgment (automatically losing the case). 68
Additionally, sanctions including a finding of contempt can
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
66. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1109 (9th ed. 2009).
67. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
68. FED R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vii); Societe Internationale Pour Participations
Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958) (holding that
dismissal of case for failure to disclose due to blocking statute not appropriate, but
suggesting inferences could be applied against the nondisclosing party).
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carry large fines. 69 The purposes of fines related to civil contempt
are either to coerce the company into complying with the court
order or to compensate the other party.70 When determining the
size of contempt fines, a court will try to make it more economical
for the company to comply with the order than to continue its
contemptuous behavior. 71
A case from the 1970s involving International Business
Machines Corporation (IBM) demonstrates the severe extent of such
contempt fines. 72 In International Business Machines Corporation v.
U.S., IBM was faced with a discovery order in an antitrust suit. 73
When IBM did not comply with the discovery order, the court held
IBM in contempt and applied a coercive fine of $150,000 per day
until IBM handed over the documents.74 On appeal, the Second
Circuit affirmed the fine, stating that it was appropriate for the
lower court to consider IBM's size and ability to pay.7 5 The court
pointed out that $150,000.00 per day was only 5% of IBM's average
daily profit. 76
Large contempt fines can be applied even when the reason for
nondisclosure of the information is that a foreign law precludes
discovery. For example, in Richmark Corporation v. Timber Falling
Consultants, Richmark refused to supply discovery information to
the opposing party, citing a Chinese blocking statute that made it
illegal to disclose the information.77  The court assumed that
Chinese law did in fact prohibit disclosure.78 Nonetheless, the court
awarded the opposing party with approximately $24,000 in
attorney's fees and costs, and $10,000 per day until the information
was disclosed. 79
69. 18 U.S.C. § 401.
70. Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. ACME Quilting Co., Inc., 673 F.2d 53, 56 (2d Cir.
1982).
71. Id. at 56.
72. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp. v. United States, 493 F.2d 112, 113 (2d Cir. 1973).
73. Id. at 113-14.
74. Id. at 114.
75. Id. at 115.
76. Id. at 116.
77. Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir.
1992).
78. Id. at 1474.
79. Id. at 1471, 1482.
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In summary, the conflict between broad U.S. discovery and the
restrictive BDSG privacy laws could lead to a company being caught
in an impossible situation. On the one hand, the company would be
expected to provide the information to avoid very large fines from
the U.S. court. On the other hand, the company would be required
by German law not to reveal the information on threat of civil or
criminal penalties (e.g., fines in excess of E300,000 and/or
imprisonment, c.f. Part II.C).
III. Parties Can Prevent Discovery by Asking the Court for a
Protective Order
When a company with information stored in Germany is faced
with U.S. discovery that conflicts with the BDSG, it has two distinct
options for preventing discovery. The first is to ask the court for a
protective order under FRCP Rule 26(c).
A. Protective Orders
A protective order is a court order preventing a disclosure of
materials in discovery, or at least limiting the way the information is
disclosed.80 The party responding to the discovery request (i.e., the
German party) can move for a protective order without waiting for
the requesting party (i.e., the U.S. party) to ask the court for a
motion to compel.
The party moving for a protective order must show that there is
"good cause" to grant the motion.81 This good cause requires a
showing of a "particular need for protection" from discovery.82 In
other words, the German company faced with U.S. discovery that
conflicts with the BDSG will have the burden of convincing the
court that the German law leads to a specific need to be protected
from discovery, and thus that there is good cause for a protective
order.
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
81. Id.; In re Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, LLC, 605 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2010); Traynor v. Liu, 495 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451 (D. Del. 2007).
82. Traynor, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 452.
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B. Protective Orders Can Apply to Data Covered by the BDSG
U.S. cases refer to foreign laws that prevent discovery as
"blocking statutes." 83 This includes the BDSG.84 However, the mere
existence of a blocking statute is not sufficient to prevent discovery.
When there is a direct conflict between the FRCP discovery rules
and a blocking statute, the federal U.S. court may still require the
foreign company to disclose the data, even if this would require the
company to break the law in its own country.85 However, the U.S.
Supreme Court has directed lower courts to be cognizant of foreign
laws, including blocking statutes, when ruling on discovery issues.86
Thus, it is necessary to discuss what a federal U.S. court will
consider when deciding whether to grant a protective order because
of the BDSG.
Before addressing whether the BDSG satisfies the good cause
requirement, it is important that the court believes that the BDSG
actually applies. The party moving for the protective order has the
burden of convincing the court that the blocking statute prohibits
disclosure of the particular information requested.87  For our
purposes, this means the German party. Also, as mentioned above,
the legal standard contained in the FRCP for determining when a
protective order should be granted is good cause, and the burden
for that standard rests on the proponent (here the German party). In
other words, a German party that asks the court for a protective
order because it is faced with an e-discovery request which conflicts
with the BDSG, would have to show two facts. First, it would need
to show that the e-discovery really would violate the BDSG.
Second, it would have to show that the conflict is good cause not to
require discovery.
83. Patzak, supra note 48, at 13.
84. Id.
85. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District. Court, 482 U.S.
522, 543 (1987).
86. Id. at 543; see also id. at 554 (Blackmun, J. concurring) (emphasizing the role
of comity).
87. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 822 F.2d 335, 343 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding
that the burden of proof in protective order is on the proponent); In re Vitamins
Antitrust Litigation, 2001 WL 1049433, at *8 (D.D.C. June 20, 2001) (applying same
burden to protective order based on BDSG).
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C. Establishing Good Cause Through the BDSG
In a recent case, In re Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Marketing,
Sales Practices and Products Liability Litigation (Yasmin), the plaintiff
requested the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois to
remove a previously-granted protective order.88 First, the German
defendant used an expert in German law to show that the data was
covered by the BDSG.89 As part of this, the defendant showed that
it would not be practicable to get the consent of all of the subjects of
the data.90 Next, the German defendant convinced the court that the
BDSG, as well as the privacy interests that it protects, were good
cause for the purposes of a protective order. 91 In other words, the
combination of the BDSG and the privacy interests of the subjects of
the data was sufficient to prevent discovery of the personal
information. Thus, the court upheld the protective order,
preventing discovery of the data. 92 The court did not discuss the
interests of the nation of Germany.93 Instead, it based its decision on
the privacy interests of the individuals. 94
Interestingly, the Yasmin court mentioned a U.S. Supreme Court
case, Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa, discussed below, but the court
did not use the Aerospatiale test; it simply found that the German
defendants had carried their burden of demonstrating good cause. 95
IV_ The German Party Can Prevent FRCP Discovery
Through Comity
A second option for preventing the discovery is to convince the
court not to exercise its power to require discovery. In such a
situation, a U.S. court will use either the Aerospatiale test or the
Restatement test to balance the interests of the party seeking
discovery against the interests of the foreign state preventing that
discovery. Depending on its findings, the court will either grant or
88. 2011 WL 5507057, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2011).
89. Id. at *3.
90. Id. at *4.
91. Id. at *3.
92. Id. at *1.
93. Id.
94. Id. at *2, *4.
95. Id. at *2.
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deny the use of the FRCP. If the court decides not to require
discovery under the FRCP, then the remaining option for the
requesting party is to use the Hague Evidence Convention.
A. Use of the Hague Evidence Convention Is Not Required
Both the United States and Germany have signed The
Convention on the Hague Evidence Convention. 96 That agreement
provides a forum for gaining information from a foreign party in a
lawsuit. Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the
parties in a federal lawsuit involving signatories to that convention
are not obligated to use that Convention, and may sometimes still
use the FRCP.97 The remaining question is when parties can use
discovery under the FRCP, and when the court will require them to
resort to the Hague Evidence Convention. See Part V for further
discussion of the use of the Hague Evidence Convention.
B. Aerospatiale and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law
When faced with blocking statutes (e.g., the BDSG), some courts
have used the concept of comity (respect to a foreign nation's laws)
to restrain their own power to require discovery under the FRCP.
Thus, in Aerospatiale, the U.S. Supreme Court listed three general
factors for lower courts to consider when deciding whether to allow
discovery under the FRCP or to deny discovery, and thus require
the party to use the Hague Evidence Convention. 98 Those factors
are:
1. the particular facts of the case;
2. the sovereign interests of the foreign state and the U.S.;
and
3. the likelihood that resort to the Hague Evidence
Convention would prove effective.
Furthermore, in the same case, the Supreme Court said that the
test contained in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
96. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 55; see Hague Conference on
International Private Law, Members, available at http://www.hcch.net/index-en.
php? act=states.listing (list of current signatories).
97. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 482 U.S.
522, 539 (1987).
98. Id. at 544.
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(Restatement) would also be relevant. 99 The Restatement is not
binding on courts, but it was produced by the prestigious American
Law Institute.100 Therefore, some federal U.S. courts have looked to
§ 442(1)(c) of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
when deciding whether to require discovery that conflicts with
blocking statutes (such as the BDSG). 101 Section 442(1)(c) says that
the court should look at five factors:
1. the importance to the investigation or litigation of the
documents or other information requested;
2. the degree of specificity of the request;
3. whether the information originated in the United States;
4. the availability of alternative means of securing the
information; and
5. the extent to which noncompliance with the request
would undermine important interests of the United
States, or compliance with the request would undermine
important interests of the state where the information is
located.
These two tests are very similar - the first three factors of the
Restatement test are roughly equivalent to "the particular facts of
the case" from Aerospatiale, while the remaining two factors of each
are comparable.
If a German party shows that the BDSG applies, it could then
use either test to argue against the use of the FRCP. However, not
all U.S. courts use these tests, and some have instead looked for
good cause as discussed above. Furthermore, regardless of whether
these tests are used for a protective order with good cause, some
commentators suggest that the current trend in U.S. courts is to
prevent discovery that conflicts with foreign law in civil cases
(though not in criminal cases, where the interests of the U.S.
government are involved). 102
99. Id. at 544 n.8.
100. For information on the American Law Institute (ALI) and the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1987), see generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
(last visited Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.ali.org.
101. Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1479 (9th Cir.
1992); See also Volkswagen, A.G. v. Valdez, 909 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. 1995) (Texas
Supreme Court case requiring lower court to apply the Restatement Third of
Foreign Relations Law).
102. Thomas P. Branigan & David J. Gentile, Foreign Privacy Laws in US Courts,
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One factor in both tests is how successful another discovery
method would be, particularly the Hague Evidence Convention. To
prevent use of the FRCP, the German party will argue that the
Convention can be used just as successfully as the FRCP. For this
reason, the Hague Evidence Convention will be discussed further in
Part V below.
C. Cases Using Either Aerospatiale or the Restatement
At present, there are relatively few U.S. cases that specifically
address the conflict between discovery and the BDSG. In 2001, in
the case In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, the District Court for the
District of Colombia decided a civil antitrust case where the
plaintiffs asked for discovery from three German defendants. 03 The
defendants argued that the BDSG should preclude discovery under
FRCP, and the German government even submitted an amicus brief
on behalf of the German defendants.1 04 Nonetheless, after applying
the Aerospatiale test, the court found that the plaintiffs could
discover the data using the FRCP.105 However, the court's
discussion suggested that it reached this conclusion because the
German defendants did not prove that all of the information was
protected by the BDSG, and because the defendants had been
uncooperative throughout the case.106 Furthermore, it was alleged
that the German defendants had tried to conceal information by
transferring it from the United States to German affiliates in order
for the BDSG to preclude discovery.107
In a state case, the Supreme Court of Texas relied on the
Restatement factors. In that case, a tort plaintiff was trying to use
discovery to access Volkswagen AG's company phone directory. 108
The lower court did not apply the Restatement test, and simply
required discovery.109 The Supreme Court of Texas found that
Volkswagen AG had shown that the discovery did conflict with the
51 FOR THE DEFENSE, no. 3, 2008, at 62-63.
103. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 2001 WL 1049433, at *2 (D.D.C. June 20,
2001).
104. Id. at *7, n.13.
105. Id. at *7.
106. Id. at *8-9.
107. Id. at *5.
108. Volkswagen, A.G. v. Valdez, 909 S.W.2d 900, 901 (Tex. 1995).
109. Id. at 903.
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BDSG and thus the lower court had erred by not using the
Restatement test.110 The Texas Supreme Court then applied the
Restatement test and found that only one of the factors weighed in
favor of allowing discovery: The request was specific because it
identified a clear document."1 However, the other factors weighed
in favor of Volkswagen AG's request for a protective order: The
information was not important to the litigation, the information
originated in Germany, there were alternative means of obtaining
the information, and Germany's interests would be undermined by
allowing discovery.112 Thus, the court reversed the lower court's
decision and prevented discovery.113
V. The Hague Evidence Convention
If a court decides that discovery should not proceed under the
FRCP, it does not necessarily mean that the requesting party will be
unable to obtain the information it seeks. Another way to obtain
information in civil and commercial cases is through the Hague
Evidence Convention. Both the United States and Germany have
signed the Hague Evidence Convention.114 As described in Part IV,
part of the Aerospatiale test is to show that the Convention could be
used effectively. So, it is essential to know how the Convention
works. Of course, if a German party convinces the U.S. court not to
use the FRCP, it is the other party (the U.S. party) that would be
forced to use the Hague Evidence Convention.
A. The Hague Evidence Convention Does Not Allow U.S.
E-Discovery in Germany
As discussed in Part II, U.S. e-discovery is very extensive, and
the FRCP allows the party seeking discovery to obtain relevant
information, including information that might lead to other
admissible evidence.115 Thus a party to a U.S. lawsuit using the
FRCP could ask for e-discovery, requesting a large number of
110. Id.
111. Id. at 902.
112. Id. at 902-03.
113. Id. at 903.
114. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 55. For list of current signatories
see The Hague Conference of International Private Law, supra note 56.
115. FED. R. Clv. P. 26(b)(1).
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documents that the other party might possibly possess. However,
under the Hague Evidence Convention, the party must request
documents that are known to exist, not a document that might or
might not exist like in U.S. discovery. 116 Also, the document
requested must itself be admissible evidence, not only potentially
lead to admissible evidence. 117 Furthermore, the extent of the
documents that could be obtained under the Hague Evidence
Convention may be far more limited than under the FRCP since the
court receiving the request will apply its own lex fori (local
procedural law) with regard to the taking of evidence. This is
especially true for information held in Germany, because Germany
entered a reservation to the Hague Evidence Convention under
Article 23.118 Article 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention says that
if a state makes such a reservation, it will not execute a Letter of
Request for common law pretrial discovery of documents. 119 For
most states that have made such a reservation, this means that if a
request is "reasonable and specific" it is likely to be executed. 120
However, the reservation made by Germany has been interpreted as
particularly restrictive and will block pretrial discovery of
documents entirely.
Accordingly, German courts have held U.S. pretrial discovery
to be an appropriate source for Hague Evidence Convention
requests, but that the Article 23 reservation precludes the use of
such a request for obtaining documents. Thus, in a 1980 case, the
Munich Appeals Court ruled that German courts must comply with
a Hague Evidence Convention request to take pretrial depositions of
witnesses. 121  The court reasoned that pretrial discovery is the
fundamental principle of taking evidence in a U.S. trial, and thus it
is part of a "judicial proceeding, commenced or contemplated"
within the meaning of Article 1, Paragraph 2 of the Hague Evidence
116. Laura W. Smalley, How to Conduct International Discovery, 71 AM. JUR. TRIALS
1, § 31 (2012).
117. Id.
118. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 55, art. 23; The Hague Conference
of International Private Law, supra note 56.
119. Id.
120. Smalley, supra note 116, § 31 .
121. Rechtsprechung Der Oberlandesgerichte in Zivilsachen [OLGZ] [higher
regional civil court] 1981, 235 (240) OLG MUNCHEN (9. ZS), Beschlufi vom 27.11.1980
- 9 VA 4/80.
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Convention. 122
In 2008, the Celle Court of Appeals was faced with a Letter of
Request through the Hague Evidence Convention for both
depositions and documents. 123 The court pointed to some scholars'
opinion that Article 23 should only be interpreted to prevent fishing
expeditions, and that a specific and necessary document should be
discoverable.124 Nonetheless, the Celle Court of Appeals only
allowed the pretrial deposition, and found that Germany's Article
23 reservation specifically precluded the pretrial discovery of
documents.125 The court added the caveat that, during the course of
a deposition, the witness could be asked to disclose the contents of a
specific document.126 In other words, the U.S. party's pretrial Letter
of Request could ask the German court to have a witness describe
the contents of a specific document.
In summary, under the FRCP, a party can request a large
number of electronically stored documents that are relevant to the
lawsuit. Under a Hague Convention Letter of Request, a party can
only request a specific and known document that is itself admissible
evidence. Furthermore, in Germany, a party cannot request any
document through the Hague Evidence Convention because of the
restrictive interpretation of Germany's Article 23 reservation. In
short, pretrial e-discovery of information in Germany is impossible
under the Hague Evidence Convention, and even if the request
could be made during trial, the discoverable information would be
very limited; however, if a certain piece of information is to be
produced during trial, the Hague Evidence Convention is an
alternative.
B. How to Make a Request Under the Hague Evidence Convention
If Germany's Article 23 reservation does not block the taking of
evidence, there are three ways to proceed under the Hague
122. Id.; Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 55, art. 1. It is interesting to
note that this same reasoning could be applied to the legally required transfer
exception discussed in Part II.C. Nonetheless, the Hague Evidence Convention
uses the broader wording of a "judicial proceeding, commenced or contemplated,"
while the BDSG is more restrictive, requiring that the legal claim be made "before a
court." See Part 2.3.
123. NJW-RR 2008, 78, 78-79, OLG Celle, Beschlufi vom 6.7.2007 - 16 VA 5/07.
124. Id. at 79.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 80.
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Evidence Convention. They are to use a Letter of Request, to
proceed through a consular officer, or to have a private
commissioner appointed by the foreign state. 127 Parties use a Letter
of Request most often, and this can be used to request documents,
depositions, or interrogatories. 128 The other two methods rely on a
person who is physically present to ask questions, so they are
primarily applicable to depositions. Because this article focuses on
conflicts with U.S. e-discovery, which is based on discovering
electronic documents, the Letter of Request is the most relevant
method.
A Letter of Request is exactly what its name suggests. Under
the Hague Evidence Convention, a requesting authority (e.g., a U.S.
judge) sends the Letter of Request to an executing authority. 129 In
the case of Germany, the executing authority is the local court
(Amtsgericht) in the German state (Bundesland) where the evidence is
located. 130 If the request is appropriate, the authority then obtains
the requested evidence from the German party and sends it back to
the requesting party.
C. What a Letter of Request Must Contain
For a Letter of Request to be successful, it must contain the
information specified in the Hague Evidence Convention and meet
Germany's reservations to that convention. The Convention requires
a Letter of Request to contain the following:
1. the requesting (U.S.) authority,
2. the executing (German) authority,
3. the names and addresses of the parties and
representatives,
4. information on the proceeding, and
5. the evidence to be obtained.
And where necessary to include:
1. the name and address of the person being examined,
127. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 55, arts. 1, 15, 17.
128. Ved P. Nanda & David K. Pansius, Mechanics of the Evidence Convention, 3
LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 17:18 (2012).
129. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 55, art. 1.
130. For Germany's reservations to the Hague Evidence Convention, see The
Hague Conference of International Private Law, supra note 56.
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2. the questions for the person examined,
3. the document or other property to be inspected,
4. any oath that might be required, and
5. any special methods or procedures to be followed. 131
In light of Germany's Article 23 reservation against pretrial
discovery (discussed above in Part V.A), it is also important to say
in the Letter of Request that the evidence is relevant to pending
litigation, and that it is likely to be used at trial.132 However, the
German authority will probably reject any request with regard to
pretrial discovery of documents pursuant to the reservations made
under Article 23.
If a Letter of Request meets all of these requirements, the Hague
Evidence Convention says that it must be executed by the German
authorities unless:
1. the function requested does not fall under the judiciary in
the state of execution (Germany), or
2. the state of execution (Germany) considers that its
sovereignty would be prejudiced thereby. 133
In the case of a request for a document, the first possibility does not
pose a problem because obtaining a document is a function that
German courts can perform. However, the second exception to
execution of the Letter of Request means that, even without the
Article 23 reservation, the German authorities would not be
required to comply with a request that it considered a violation of
its sovereignty.
VI. Avoiding the E-Discovery vs. BDSG Conflict
So far, this article has discussed what conflicts may arise
between e-discovery and the BDSG, and what the options are for a
party with information stored in Germany once the conflict arises.
Next, we will discuss some ways such a company could avoid the
conflict and its consequences.
131. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 55, art. 3.
132. Smalley, supra note 16.
133. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 55, art. 12.
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A. Store Private Information Separately
One way to avoid the conflict is to prevent the disclosure from
being covered by the BDSG. As discussed in Part II.C, the BDSG
applies to personal information. Thus if a discovery request seeks
information that is not covered by the BDSG, but happens to be
stored in the same place as the personal information, a German
party may be unable to separate the information. At the very least,
keeping personal and nonpersonal information separate would
reduce the costs of later separating the information. Of course, this
option is not helpful if the personal information is itself the target of
the discovery request.
B. Keep Information Gathered Elsewhere Out of Germany
The BDSG applies to personal data that is collected, processed
or used in Germany (see Part II.C). Therefore, another way to
prevent the conflict is to avoid handling the information in
Germany, or in any other EU member state because of Directive
95/46/EC. For instance, data collected in the United States would
not involve the BDSG. But if that same data were later processed or
used in Germany, the BDSG would then apply, prohibiting
disclosure even though it did not originally.
However, as in the Vitamins case discussed above in Part IV.C, a
U.S. court is not likely to look favorably upon such a tactic used
intentionally. Whether or not a German party had the intention of
transferring information in order to gain the protection of the BDSG,
it would be wise to avoid involving the BDSG if it can simply be
avoided. Thus personal data from outside of Germany (especially
from the United States) should not be handled in Germany
unnecessarily.
The same is true for handling information in other nations with
blocking statutes, including all of the EU nations which have
statutes based on Directive 94/46/EC (see Part II.C). Unfortunately,
this advice is not applicable to information that was collected in
Germany, because the BDSG already applies to such information.
C. Cooperate With the Opposing Party and the Court
Once the discovery request has been made, a German party
should cooperate with the opposing party and the U.S. court. The
case law suggests that if a party makes a good faith effort to
cooperate during discovery, U.S. courts are more likely to grant a
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protective order and less likely to apply sanctions.14  Such
cooperation may include suggesting other means of providing the
requested information (such as the Hague Evidence Convention) or
providing alternate information. 135
D. Cull and Anonymize the Data
As discussed in Part II.C above, one exception to the
prohibition on disclosure under the BDSG is a legitimate interest of
the data controller where it is not outweighed by the legitimate
interests of nondisclosure held by the data subject. Because the
BDSG is based on Directive 95/46/EC, the Data Protection Working
Party's advice under that directive is relevant here.
The Data Protection Working Party recommends anonymizing
(removing identifying information such as the data subject's name)
or at least pseudonymizing the data (replacing the name with a
pseudonym) to the extent possible.136  Additionally, the Data
Protection Working Party recommends that the parties to a lawsuit
select a neutral third party in the EU to filter or cull the data before
sending it outside of the EU.137 This would minimize the amount of
personal information transferred out of the EU. In most cases, this
reduced amount of anonymized data will still be sufficient for
purposes of litigation, and it will also be more likely to fit within the
legitimate interest exception to nondisclosure in the BDSG.138 If the
initial disclosure is insufficient for discovery purposes, a second,
nonanonymous disclosure could always be attempted at a later date.
In other words, culling and partially anonymizing the data does
134. Compare Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1479
(9th Cir. 1992) (in affirming contempt fines, the court found Richmark had not
made a good faith effort to comply with court order); and In re Vitamins Antitrust
Litigation, 2001 WL 1049433, at *5 (D.D.C. June 20, 2001) (court considered the
alleged behavior of defendants in destroying and concealing documents when
finding Aerospatiale test weighed in favor of allowing FRCP discovery) with In re
Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (sanctions not appropriate for third
party foreign bank that attempted to comply in good faith).
135. Volkswagen, A.G. v. Valdez, 909 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Tex. 1995) (finding that
Volkswagon A.G. supplied sufficient alternative discovery sources in deciding that
discovery of BDSG-prohibited information should not proceed under the FRCP).
136. Working Document on Pretrial Discovery, supra note 52, at 10. The English
translation of the BDSG refers to replacing the data subject's name with a
pseudonym as "aliasing." BDSG, § 3(6a).
137. Working Document on Pretrial Discovery, supra note 52, at 10-11.
138. Id.
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not guarantee that disclosure will be lawful under the BDSG, nor
that the U.S. court will find that the information disclosed will be
sufficient to satisfy the party's discovery obligations. Nonetheless,
in many cases, it may be a strong option to fulfill both conflicting
obligations.
Furthermore, if the data can be rendered entirely anonymous,
and the remaining information cannot lead to the identification of a
specific person, then it would no longer fit the definition of
"personal data" under the BDSG (see Part II.C). Thus this fully-
anonymized information could be transferred without violating the
BDSG. Of course, whether a reduced set of data containing
absolutely no identifying information is sufficient for the purposes
of the litigation will depend on the facts of the case.
E. Get Consent From the Data Subject
If the data subject consents to the disclosure, the German party
could disclose the data without violating the BDSG (see Part II.C
above). Thus if there are only a few data subjects, the German party
could request consent to disclose the information from each of them.
If they consent, the German party could then proceed to disclose the
information without violating the BDSG.
Of course, as the Data Protection Working Party pointed out in
relation to the directive, valid consent requires that the data subject
had the opportunity to withhold and withdraw that consent without
any negative consequences. 3 9 The BDSG refers to this consent as
being based on a "free decision."140 Thus with third party data
subjects, such as customers, the German party would need to
provide clear evidence that the data subject was fully informed in
order to make that decision.141  Where the data subject is an
employee, there could be added complications in showing that the
consent was freely given without the threat of any penalty.142
Therefore, if the number of data subjects is small enough that
obtaining consent is practicable, parties should still be cautious. So
while the Data Protection Working Party is of the opinion that
consent may be a proper ground for disclosure in limited cases (e.g.
139. Id. at 9.
140. BDSG, § 4a(1).
141. Working Document on Pretrial Discovery, supra note 52, at 9.
142. Id.
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where the subject is herself involved in the litigation) it will not be
appropriate in most cases. 143
F. Establish and Use a Data Protection Policy
Both the FRCP and the BDSG contemplate that ESI will only be
kept for a limited period of time. Under FRCP 37(e), a party cannot
be sanctioned for not delivering information that was lost through
"routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information
system." 144 Thus many U.S. companies have a so-called "document
retention policy" by which the company decides what data will be
saved, and what data will be destroyed, and how often. 145
However, such document destruction must not include information
that the party "can reasonably foresee is material to a potential or
pending legal dispute." 46  This leads to the "litigation hold"
whereby the company must direct its employees to locate and
preserve relevant documents once it foresees the possibility of
litigation.147
Similarly, the BDSG requires that personal information will not
be preserved longer than necessary. If the purpose of collecting the
information was for the benefit of the data controller, then the
information must be deleted once that purpose is fulfilled. 148 If the
data was processed for the purposes of a later transfer, and they are
no longer necessary after four years, they must also be destroyed. 149
Furthermore, the BDSG permits destruction anytime with a few
exceptions.150
In short, while the FRCP allows documents to be destroyed
until litigation is foreseeable, the BDSG requires personal
information to be destroyed in most circumstances. Thus
establishing and following a document retention policy that
conforms to the BDSG, would allow a company to fulfill both sets of
143. Id. at 8-9.
144. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
145. 125 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FAcTs 3D 93 § 3 (2012).
146. Id. § 3.
147. Id. § 11.
148. BDSG, § 35(2)3.
149. Id. § 35(2)4.
150. Id. § 35(2) (permissive erasure), § 35(3) (exceptions for legally required
retention periods, contractually agreed retention, where erasure would harm the
data subject, or impossibility).
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obligations (except in the theoretical case where litigation became
foreseeable and then the respective BDSG retention period ran out).
A company would be well advised to establish and use a document
retention policy in order to minimize the amount of data that would
be subject to conflicting demands by FRCP e-discovery and the
BDSG.
G. Register With the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework
Understanding the need for multinational corporations to be
able to transfer data between countries, the U.S. Department of
Commerce and the European Commission developed a way for
companies to satisfy privacy protection under Directive 95/46/EC.
Through the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework, an eligible company
certifies on a yearly basis that it will comply with seven data
protection requirements (Notice, Choice, Onward Transfer to Third
Parties, Access, Security, Data Integrity, and Enforcement). 151 In
return, the company will be deemed to provide the required
"adequate level of protection", allowing transfers of data from the
European Union to that company in the United States.152
Enforcement of the framework is managed in the United States by a
combination of private sector enforcement (i.e., the company's own
dispute resolution system) and U.S. government enforcement (i.e.
by the Federal Trade Commission).153
Even so, as discussed above in Part II.C, fulfilling the adequacy
determination only satisfies the exception for the BDSG's transfer
restriction. It does not satisfy the purpose restriction. In order to
fulfill the purpose restriction, the German party would need another
exception, such as demonstrating a legitimate interest of the data
controller. Furthermore, the Data Protection Working Party
specifically disapproves of companies using Safe Harbor to move all
data to the United States for the purposes of potential future
litigation.154
151. For a description of these requirements and other information on the Safe
Harbor Framework, see the official Safe Harbor website at http://export.gov/
safeharbor.
152. Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and of the Council, supra note
30, art. 25 §1, at 45.
153. Welcome to the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor, supra note 59.
154. Working Document on Pretrial Discovery, supra note 52, at 13.
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H. Request Opinion of the Supervisory Authority or the BfDI
The individual German states each appoint their own
supervisory authority under the BDSG.155 These supervisory
authorities are charged with the oversight of individual German
companies within their jurisdiction, including advising those
companies in regards to their obligations under the BDSG.156 Thus a
German party to a U.S. lawsuit could request an opinion of the
applicable supervisory authority in his federal state. Of course, a
letter from the BfDI advising the company of its BDSG obligations
would probably hold more sway in the opinion of a U.S. judge
because the BfDI is a federal rather than state agency. However, the
duties of the BfDI as described in the BDSG do not specifically
include giving such determinations. 57 Still, a German party could
request a determination from the BfDI in the hopes of receiving a
legal opinion from that body.
If the supervisory authority and/or the BfDI respond by saying
that the German party may provide the requested information, then
the German party would have reason to believe there is no conflict,
and it would simply comply with the discovery request. However,
it is more likely that the opinion would state that the German party
cannot turn over the personal information under the restrictions of
the BDSG. In that case, the German party would at least have an
official German government determination to show to the U.S.
judge. This official statement may assist the German party in
convincing the judge not to require discovery under the FRCP using
one of the two methods discussed above for preventing it, especially
by reasoning that the determination is a statement of the German
government's interests. Furthermore, requesting permission from
the supervisory authority would demonstrate to the court that the
German party is at least attempting to comply in good faith, which
fits with the above advice to cooperate.
VII. Conclusion
In short, a broad reaching e-discovery request under federal
U.S. discovery rules may conflict with the BDSG. This will occur if
the discovery request includes information that falls under the
155. BDSG, § 38(6).
156. Id. § 38(1).
157. See id. §§ 22 et seq.
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BDSG's broad definition of "personal data." If this conflict arises,
the German party may prevent discovery by one of two methods.
The first is to request a protective order under FRCP Rule 26(c). The
German party would then have the burden of proving that the
BDSG conflicts with the discovery request, and must subsequently
show that the legal conflict is good cause to prevent discovery. The
second method is to prevent the application of the FRCP to the
information by showing that comity outweighs the benefits of
allowing discovery. The party could show this by relying on the
Aerospatiale test or the Restatement test.
Under either method, the German party would have the burden
of convincing the court not to allow discovery under the FRCP.
Neither method is guaranteed to prevent discovery, so deciding
which way to proceed may simply depend on which particular U.S.
court the German party is facing. Even if the U.S. court does not
allow discovery under the FRCP, the requesting party could use the
Hague Evidence Convention to try to obtain the information.
However, the Hague Evidence Convention does not allow e-
discovery. It only allows access to specific and known documents,
and in Germany, that access is only through a deposition where the
witness is asked to discuss the contents of that document.
Although there may be a trend in U.S. courts towards
preventing discovery of information covered by blocking statutes in
civil cases, it is important for companies handling information in
Germany to be careful not to run into problems with e-discovery.
Such a conflict could result in harsh sanctions in the United States or
fines and criminal sanctions in Germany. In order to avoid such
problems, the authors of this article recommend at a minimum
avoiding transferring outside information into Germany, culling
and anonymizing the data to the extent possible, and cooperating
with the court and the opposing party.
Ultimately, the conflict between blocking statutes such as the
BDSG and U.S. e-discovery is a significant issue that can only be
expected to expand as the number of international businesses
continues to increase. Fortunately, with informed business practices
and thoughtful legal action, international businesses can avoid the
problem or mitigate its consequences.
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